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ABSTRACT 
There are numerous computer-aided tools to enable Computer Network 
Defense.  However, their effectiveness in countering attacks is less than optimal 
when they are used independently of one another. Research has identified the 
requirements for an integrated command and control (C2) system that is able to 
conduct full-spectrum operations in the cyberspace environment.  The most 
notable of that research revolves around the development and experimentation 
with the prototype system known as Cyber Command, Control and Information 
Operations System (C3IOS). C3IOS provides for a loose confederation of the 
cooperating systems with interaction between systems going through C2 
interfaces. In this thesis, the authors introduce into C3IOS a means to support 
the commander’s ability to take measured responses to coercive actions in a 
timely manner, specifically to facilitate the interaction between experts in the law 
of information conflict and information warriors responding to a cyber attack. The 
authors’ research results in a set of use cases and requirements for the C2 
understanding, planning, and deciding activities involved in such a capability, 
using Schmitt’s analysis as an example. 
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Enterprise-level, distributed command and control (C2) (also known as 
integrated C2) across administrative domains (i.e., organizational boundaries) for 
use in cyberspace is a relatively unexplored area of research.  C2 paradigms 
applied in the kinetic world are not necessarily well suited for use in the context 
of prosecuting engagements in cyberspace in response to cyber attacks.  There 
are many reasons for the mismatch, such as the fact that the tempo of attack is 
much higher in cyberspace than that of the physical world, precluding the use of 
serial communication of orders and the use of hierarchical command structures. 
Concerning cyber attacks, the organization whose cyber assets have been 
targeted must be able to rapidly understand the nature of the attack through 
shared knowledge and situational awareness.  
Situational awareness is the process of recognizing a threat at an 
early stage and taking measures to avoid it. Being observant of 
one’s surroundings and identifying potential threats and dangerous 
situations is more of an attitude or mindset than it is a hard skill. [1]  
The organization must swiftly select courses of action and plans, 
communicate intent and guidance, task (i.e., synchronize operations, issue plans 
and orders), and monitor (i.e., assess the following: guidance, compliance with 
guidance, effects, and achievement of objectives).  Given that a single attack can 
target multiple systems owned or administrated by multiple organizations, these 
organizations need to coordinate their efforts in advance, to the highest degree 
possible, through organizing (e.g., coordinating with mission partners, 
establishing collaborative policies and procedures, integrating capabilities, 
establishing commander’s expectations), planning, developing metrics, and so 
on. 
Research has been done to identify requirements for an integrated C2 
model that is able to conduct full-spectrum operations in cyberspace. The 
problem is that in the context of distributed real-time cyber defense networks, 
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one misses the legal grounding with respect to the adopted responses. One has 
to be sure that the means, the timing, and all the ramifications of the response 
are within the bounds of the law, policy, and rules of engagement. Information 
warriors used to make decisions based on localized information that they 
obtained from their Area of Responsibility (AOR), instead of looking at the 
broader picture of the cyber battle space. Going in this direction, one needs to 
fully address the problem by looking at the three-dimensional “cube” model 
introduced by Tom Wingfield and Eineken Tikk. The model depicts “the 
possible”—representing the technology, “the permissible”—representing the law, 
and “the preferable”—representing the art of the preferable. Assuming that 
distributed real-time C2 systems provide solid platforms upon which to conduct 
cyberspace defense operations, one still needs to accelerate the process of the 
legal coverage of actions in the ever-changing cyberspace environment. 
In this thesis, the authors address the information warrior’s challenge of 
obtaining just-in-time legal advice.  They propose the implementation of 
computer-assisted legal reasoning for integrated C2 in cyber operations. The 
information warrior needs the right recommendations for action, at the right time, 
provided by legal experts and others involved in cyber operations, and the ability 
to obtain timely approval of courses of action by the chain of command. Such a 
system capability will not dictate the way to conduct cyber warfare, but instead 
will support the ability of gaining approved legal advice in real or near real-time 
operations.  
An integrated C2 system, with the proposed legal advice capability, can be 
used either by the military or other actors—including organizations in the private 
sector—that have a role in defending themselves or others in cyberspace. Any 
computing resource that connects to the Internet has to have some level of 
protection, but it may not be economically or otherwise justifiable to protect every 
computing resource using a full-up dynamic C2 battle management type of 
system. 
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There are organizations that have critical infrastructures and systems that 
need to be protected for the sake of the entity, the organization’s customers and 
stakeholders, or even national security. For example, in the case of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) [2], an agency of the United 
States government, it is responsible for the nation's civilian space program. An 
attack on one or more of NASA’s missions could have an effect on the national 
security of the United States.  NASA is an early adopter of a prototype integrated 
C2 system called Cyber Command, Control and Information Operations System 
(C3IOS), formerly known as Cyber Operations Information System (COIS).  
C3IOS facilitates the defense by NASA of the agency’s systems, but C3IOS does 
not provide the agency with any support on reasoning about the legal 
ramifications of its defensive posture and any responses it might take in 
response to attacks on its systems. For example, NASA needs to hand off law 
enforcement tasks (e.g., collecting evidence to prosecute intruders) to law 
enforcement agencies.  
Regardless of whether C3IOS or a C3IOS-like system is being used in the 
private or public sector, its roles and hierarchical organization should be based 
on military principles, such as unity of command. There is still a need to have 
someone in charge that has the equivalent of a commander’s authority and 
responsibilities—someone who, even if he or she lacks the ability to conduct 
military operations, still needs situational awareness as well as legal and other 
support for responsible decision making.  
In this thesis, the authors focus on determining what support the 
defenders of cyber infrastructure and systems need in terms of legal consultation 
to be able to conduct cyber operations. The thesis reports the results of both a 
use case and a requirements analysis. 
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A. BACKGROUND 
1. Cyber Command, Control and Information Operations System 
(C3IOS) 
In the open literature, the only reported distributed C2 environment 
tailored for use in conducting defensive cyber operations is the aforementioned 
prototype system known as C3IOS. In order to provide cyber-based C2 
capabilities, C3IOS relies on distributed computing technologies such as virtual 
cells, mobile agents, dynamic reconfiguration, and IP address hopping. C3IOS 
also provides for proactive and anticipatory collaboration. 
The services orientation of C3IOS makes it possible to enable 
collaboration among operators, technical experts, and other decision makers as 
needed. The dynamic virtual cell is one of the defining characteristics of C3IOS. 
The dynamic virtual cell is a virtual community where people can join or leave 
before, during, or after a cyber incident. In C3IOS, the C2 system consists of two 
sets of virtual cells:  core and dynamic.  The seven core cells consist of full-time 
members who perform rapid-reaction, engineering operations, system 
administration, and other daily duties to carry out cyber defense (e.g., Kinetic 
Warfare Commander, Cyber Commander, network operations, vulnerability 
assessment, intrusion detection, intrusion response, and test bed [engineering]) 
[3]. Those roles and activities are not persistent and can be adjusted to meet the 
organization’s needs. The dynamic cells can be configured to contribute to the 
progress of a specific task and decommissioned thereafter.  
C3IOS does not dictate how to defend systems; instead, it provides battle 
management (BM) and C2 capabilities.  The current version of C3IOS does not 
provide users with support for reasoning about the law as it pertains to 
conducting computer network operations.  
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2. Schmitt’s Analysis 
A cyber incident can have various forms that can be generally categorized 
into planned malicious cyber actions, immature efforts to put a false color on 
national/private services, and the uncontrolled spread of malicious rogue code 
via worms and viruses. The malevolent actor tries to harm the targeted system or 
infrastructure. Regardless of whether the protection of systems and infrastructure 
is the responsibility of the public sector, private sector or both, the defense of the 
system or infrastructure must be conducted within the bounds of the law, to 
include international law when attacks cross national borders.  
Applying a “one-size-fits-all” response, such as always terminating 
all interaction with the rogue agent or always responding in kind 
can be an ineffective or worse, illegal, response. For instance, 
terminating interaction with a rogue actor may prevent the collection 
of evidence for criminal prosecution, counter-targeting for military 
response, or collection for a counterintelligence operation. By 
responding in kind, or conducting some form of cyber vigilantism as 
described in [Jayaswal 2002], the owner or the owner’s agent may 
violate domestic laws, or if the attack is deemed to be a “use of 
force,” may contravene the customary rules of war (accepted as 
authoritative law by the United States and punishable under 18 
U.S.C. §1097). [4] 
The authors’ work is under the framework presented by International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is also referred as the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC). IHL “defines the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, 
neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare, in relation to each other and 
to protected persons, usually meaning civilians.” [5] The law has two parts to 
include the law of conflict management (jus ad bellum) and the law of war (jus in 
bello). 
Under the imaginary framework created by the ethical behaviors and the 
rules of law presented by the LOAC, Chapter II of this thesis introduces Schmitt’s 
analysis as an example of interpreting the existed law in the context of conflicts in 
cyberspace.   Schmitt’s analysis can be applied to distinguish operations in 
accordance with the spectrum of their induced consequences, and postulate 
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either the use of force or soft countermeasures [6]. The contribution of this 
method of analysis is not to propose the actions that might need to be taken 
against a cyber incident, but to indicate whether the incident at hand will rise to 
the threshold of an armed conflict. It provides a practical framework to analyze 
the effect of key factors on the legal nature of an incident to unravel the real 
dimension of the imposed consequences [7]. 
Schmitt’s analysis answers the question of whether an attack has risen to 
the level of use of force as defined in the Charter of the United Nations and 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, taking into consideration qualitative 
and quantitative information about the methods and the consequences of the 
attack. In order to evaluate the methods and the consequences of an attack, 
Schmitt’s analysis looks to seven criteria: severity, immediacy, directness, 
invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and responsibility that 
characterize the attributes of an armed attack.   
It is not the authors’ intention to automate Schmitt’s analysis, but rather to 
provide a collaborative environment in which to bring people involved in cyber 
defense in contact with legal experts to facilitate informed decision making about 
defensive posture or responses to cyber attacks.  Schmitt’s analysis is used here 
as a case study.  
B. OBJECTIVE: A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW DYNAMIC VIRTUAL LEGAL 
CELL IN A DISTRIBUTED REAL-TIME CYBERSPACE DEFENSE 
SYSTEM 
In order to take into consideration the legal ramifications of actions that 
might be taken in response to a cyber attack, the authors propose the creation of 
a dynamic Virtual Legal Cell for C3IOS. The proposed Virtual Legal Cell, 
presented in Chapter III, needs to be added to C3IOS to support the 
commander’s ability to take measured responses to coercive actions. In order to 
take into account the qualitative and quantitative aspects of a cyber incident, the 
authors investigated how Schmitt’s analysis could be made part of this cell. 
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The thesis focuses on the C2 understanding, planning, and deciding 
activities involved in applying Schmitt’s analysis within this new virtual cell for 
C3IOS.  The authors present a set of use cases and requirements for these 
activities. 
C. CONCLUSION 
A real-time distributed cyber defense network is essential to address 
coordination issues, support rapid information gathering and finally, maintain real 
or near real-time responses. Since the legal reasoning aspect of cyber 
operations plays an integral part in shaping responses to cyber incidents, the 
authors propose a way to get legal experts engaged in a timely manner in a 
cyber operation and provide these experts situational awareness. On the other 
hand, given that the acquisition of the legal piece/grounding can be time 
consuming, the lumped lag (i.e., sum of the delays) in making decisions can slow 
the whole process dramatically and preclude timely responses. The authors 
propose the creation of a dynamic Virtual Legal Cell for C3IOS, which will be able 
to be created on demand to support the decision-making process. 
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II. CYBER COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS SYSTEM (C3IOS)  
The defense community relies heavily on interconnected information 
systems. These systems cannot rely solely on traditional defense-in-depth 
strategies to address information security concerns. In addition, systems for 
controlling the remote management of firewalls, intrusion detection systems 
(IDS), and other network components and subsystems cannot always provide 
appropriate responses to attacks or even provide information to decision makers 
about impending attacks in a timely manner.  
One can model modern defense systems as systems of systems, in which 
the collective behavior provides some added benefit that none of the individual 
systems acting autonomously can provide. In doing so, one must consider the 
emergent behavior (both desired and undesired). The constituent systems may 
be governed by different entities. Having system-of-systems-wide C2 capabilities 
is needed to ensure that defenders can obtain situational awareness of the 
cyberspace the system of systems occupies. 
The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) introduced an operational model 
for a virtual organizational structure called the Information Assurance Operations 
Center (IAOC) accompanied by a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and a 
summary of the system model infrastructure [3].  Additions were made to the 
IAOC to provide for a full-spectrum Cyber Warfare Command and Control Battle 
Management system (CWC2 BM), and the working prototype, as mentioned 
earlier, was named C3IOS.  
NASA explored the use of C3IOS in maintaining cyber warfare situational 
awareness (SA) of NASA computer networks, supporting collaboration among 
members of the various operational communities within the IAOCs, and enabling 
collaboration among other desired members of differential, pre-existing or not, 
supportive communities [8]. The IAOC implemented a peer processing 
architecture system for C2.  In this architecture, local data storage is available on 
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all nodes, messaging is accomplished based on a publish/subscribe pattern, and 
identical application suites are run on all nodes. The IAOC employs a virtual 
organization in a distributed network virtual organization to ensure the partial or 
full exchange of information among its participants to network participants in 
order to defend enterprise network computing assets against cyber attacks.  
The original intent of the creators of C3IOS was to provide the cyber 
defense community a full-spectrum cyber warfare C2 system with the aim of 
establishing effective cyber defense strategies, while at the same time improving 
both SA and addressing organizational issues. In order to address typical delays 
with traditional client-server architecture, C3IOS employs a publish/subscribe 
messaging pattern as well as a virtual shared data space that minimizes data 
queries generating and presenting situational awareness. Contributing to delays 
and generating SA include request-reply messaging patterns, as well as 
querying, tailoring and presenting data to convey SA to a user. Peer-
processing architecture (in particular, the publish/subscribe pattern and local data 
storage), is what contributes to the ability to generate rapid SA. The architectural 
characteristics employed by C3IOS permit a real-time SA for on-demand 
provisioning of services and facilitate the rapid development of COAs. The ideas 
of deliberate planning (i.e., having a plan given some scenario) and crisis 
planning are only partially appropriate in cyber warfare.  The depth and breadth 
of unknowns in cyber space dictate a more dynamic planning model that in part 
is stochastically based. On the other hand, C3IOS uses dynamic planning based 
on a stochastic model. Contrary to kinetic warfare, in cyber warfare it is difficult to 
predict or know a priori the behavior, attack vector, or signature of interest. COAs 
are often deployed based on chance. On the kinetic and cyber battlefields, 
commanders’ make decisions under uncertainty with less than 100 percent SA. 
On average, in kinetic warfare one may have 80% knowledge of the battle space, 
while in cyber warfare one probably has 20% knowledge.  In addition, in 
distributed systems, one only has partial knowledge of the state of the systems; 
that is, one does not have real-time global knowledge of the state of the 
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distributed system [9]. Attacks like distributed denial of service (DDoS), in which 
the execution path is known, can be captured in via planning and this knowledge 
can affect the COA.  However, there are other types of attacks that are unknown 
before they are launched against a target.  
As stated in the C3IOS user manual, the purpose of the system is to 
provide rapid coordination response and C2 of “defensive measures to protect 
and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, 
degradation, or destruction [10],” also called Computer Network Defense (CND). 
The dynamic CND provided by C3IOS has the capability to manage the various 
security defense tools/information to support rapid C2 decision making, response 
and command mechanisms to sustain a broader set of capabilities to maintain 
SA.  C3IOS generates a widespread real-time operating picture of the status of 
the network presented on the enterprise network display and current attacks or 
cyber operations in different displays (e.g. cyber order of battle display, attack 
status display). 
In addition, C3IOS provides a common and trusted virtual environment in 
which subject matter experts located in different physical locations from can 
cooperate to coordinate their actions across organizational and role-related lines 
[8]. At this time, it is only partially trusted, but the intent is to provide end-to-end 
security.  
The CND CONOPS is based on a virtual cell organizational model. The 
requirement that led to the adoption of the virtual cell approach, via the use of 
physical cells, was the need for a high level of flexibility and rapid response to a 
cyber incident. In traditional kinetic warfare, subordinate decisions of C2 systems 
are controlled and must be approved by the appropriate person or people in the 
chain of command in a serial manner before being executed. In the case of cyber 
defense, this type of time-consuming serial communication can prove to be 
inadequate in handling cyber incidents, as such incidents can unfold within 
seconds to a minute (e.g., zero-day attacks) and the battle can be over in as little 
as a few minutes. 
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For critical infrastructure and systems, Information Assurance Vulnerability 
Assessments (IAVA) [11] must be established in real time or near real time. The 
scope is to mitigate potential vulnerabilities to avoid situations of one-sided 
battles, in which the attacker completes or causes operations even before the 
target’s defense mechanism can detect the attack or respond. However, the 
reason IAVAs cannot be pre-established is due to the way the process is 
implemented. When an attack or vulnerability is identified, everybody is notified 
and is given a certain amount of time to patch it. However, in practice this is 
difficult to do. During a zero-day attack, there is no way to identify which type of 
patch is going to be needed. When the attack appears with no warning, there is 
no way to respond in real time; it is this sort of out-of-band process that needs to 
be in-band. In this sense, the virtual cell model is more appealing than the 
physical cell model because it provides users of C3IOS with the flexibility to 
dynamically join virtual cells in order to participate close to the field of action. The 
virtual cells are more advantageous than physical cells for this type of warfare as 
they provide speed and flexibility across network boundaries and organizations, 
which is difficult to do in traditional C2 models or organizations.  
The system relies on virtual organization operational architecture and a 
peer-processing system architecture (i.e., all nodes on the network have the 
same application suites).  This peer-processing system architecture compliments 
the operational architecture by employing peer-to-peer virtual cells. Furthermore, 
each of the members of a cell can be in more than one virtual cell concurrently, 
thereby integrating and coordinating multiple tasks that have dependencies. In 
C3IOS, the cell model is based on membership relationships versus the 
traditional C2 reports-to relationship. By employing this cell membership model 
for C2, one can maintain the command structure while simultaneously leveraging 
the power of peer-to-peer operations.  This many-to-many relationship generates 
the network relations and allows the chain-of-command relationship to be 
embedded in the organizational structure for cyber warfare [11],   thus retaining 
the ability to operate efficiently under the hierarchical warfare command structure 
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for the cases where cyber warfare must be part of an integrated kinetic warfare 
C2 system. Finally, the dynamic creation, repositioning, and decommissioning of 
virtual cells increase the resistance to attacks and fault tolerance. Figure 1 
illustrates the basic differences between the virtual P2P operational architecture 
way of organization and the strictly hierarchical kinetic one presented by physical 
cells. 
In addition, the virtual organization created with virtual cells can facilitate 
tactics like deception and maneuver [11] to provide the defender with a more 
flexible and dynamic defense against attack. When cleverly using pub/sub and 
the power of virtual cell integration in this architecture, one can rapidly 
disseminate SA and use cell integration to coordinate and collaborate, thus 
providing for an anticipatory posture rather than static reactionary ways to 
counter a cyber attack. C3IOS architecture can be anticipatory because if one 
node is subjected to an attack, the agent or sensor that detects the attack can 
automatically start publishing information about the attack to all of its peers. An 
attack on a machine in California instrumented with C3IOS can publish data 
about the attack to another node on the East Coast before that other node is 
subjected to the same attack, thus providing the opportunity for the enterprise to 
develop or deploy defenses against the attack before it arrives. 
Applied models or approaches, among others, are dynamic 
reconfigurations of systems, honeynets, mobile agent patrols, secure 
publish/subscribe communication protocols, movements of states, and 
virtualization for deception purposes. These advanced techniques provide for a 
more dynamic defense posture and operational capability.  For example, if an 
attack happens or there is some other fault on a node (e.g., cyber), with a peer 
processing architecture supported by publish/subscribe, it is possible to move 
(via publication mechanism) the last known valid state without losing any 




non-engaging way.  From the perspective of fault tolerance, the use of 
publish/subscribe provides for moving the last state to another copy of the 
application running in a different node. 
The use of deception tactics, such as IP address hopping, attempts to 
confuse potential attackers and present a changing logical structure. Similarly, 
honeypots can be applied to detect, repel or neutralize attempts of unauthorized 
access [12], or just to get attackers to waste time trying to attack the honeypot 
rather than a target of value [13].   In C3IOS, honeynets are configured in such a 
way that all activities are monitored, recorded and discretely regulated [14]. 
A maneuvering tactic can be implemented by employing the dynamic 
reconfiguration of the system or by reallocating virtual cells, thus making it 
difficult for a potential attacker to attack the cells. Another important feature of the 
system is the mobile agent. A mobile agent is a process that is able to move its 
state from one environment to the other, and to move between computers 
anytime during its execution.  
 
Figure 1.   Virtual and Physical Ways of the Organization (From [8]).  
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This special attribute makes them in general a powerful tool for 
implementing distributed applications in a network [15]. In particular, they can be 
used for mobile intrusion detection sensors. When they discover an anomaly 
(vulnerability, a hostile signature or an attack), they can publish this information 
to other agents as well as cells, and thus provide an anticipatory intrusion 
detection model. They can also be implemented with broadcast or multicast 
techniques.  Since the subscriber does not need to know where the publisher is 
located and conversely the publisher does not need to know where the 
subscriber is, they are highly autonomous and loosely coupled [15].  This has 
many advantages in any distributed computing application (e.g., scalability 
across large enterprises). 
When the aforementioned dynamic capabilities are employed through the 
execution of C3IOS, a highly dynamic cyber C2 capability is achieved. This 
capability extends beyond the benefits of traditional information assurance 
controls and defense-in-depth strategies.  With the C3IOS architecture, IA 
controls are integrated to create a more synergistic cyber defense posture and 
used to rapidly generate SA.  Furthermore, the use of the virtual organization’s 
cells, virtual shared data space, and pub/sub messaging provide for a system 
and operations architecture that facilitates and provides the capability to conduct 
real-time full-spectrum cyber operations across network and organizational 
boundaries.  
Note, that cyber warfare is a technical activity in terms of the prosecution 
of engagements. The people that fight cyber wars need to have some level of 
technical competency, although efforts have been made to minimize the needed 
level of competency, especially the efforts to make the low-level details of how 
defensive and offensive weapons and sensors work as transparent as possible to 
the information warriors [16].  
C3IOS has a wide variety of displays available to the user for such things 
as situational awareness, cyber order of battle, attack status, task management, 
drill-down of simulated attacks, and vulnerability status. Some of these ideas, like 
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cyber order of battle, are evolving.  In addition, C3IOS supports COA formulation, 
execution, and simulations. Furthermore, it employs cyber engineering cells to 
integrate cyber operational, training, rapid cyber weapon development and 
testing capabilities. Figure 2 illustrates the existing CND virtual structure of 
NASA, which is based on the membership relation. Although cyber warfare is not 
NASA’s primary mission, cyber warfare capabilities are integral to ensure mission 
success and national security. The shaded areas indicate members belonging to 
both communities [8].  
C3IOS technology can be used by both civilian and military organizations. 
It is generally accepted that cyber defense is not a purely military activity.  For 
example, Presidential Security Directive/NSC-63 (May 22, 1998) discusses the 
need to establish a public-private partnership to protect the critical infrastructure 
of the United States. C3IOS can be deployed in any critical infrastructure (e.g., 
the power grid, national air traffic control system); civilians are responsible for the 
operation of the critical infrastructure. C3IOS permits the civilian defenders to 
leverage the same operational model and a CONOPS consistent with the military 
cyber C2 architectures. Names, roles and responsibilities might be different. The 
NASA C3IOS manual illustrates the U.S. DoD’s role and NASA’s command 
structure for cyber defense. NASA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) is equivalent 
to the DoD’s Cyber Commander or Kinetic Warfare Commander. The other 
communities in the example are the Cyber Warfare (CW) and Goddard CW (one 
of the many centers within NASA) communities, the Intrusion Detection (ID) 
community, the Intrusion Response (IR) community, the Vulnerability 
Assessment (VA) community, the Network Operations (NETOPS) community, 
and the Testbed community. Every one of the core community teams consists of 
core members who have joint duty stations twenty-four hours a day, seven days 
a week. 
The CW community maintains the higher level of command in the cyber 
warfare command structure and is responsible for choosing strategies and tactics 
to defend the center’s network [8]. Note that national policy and doctrine define 
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how strategies and rules of engagement (ROE) will be defined. It 
establishes/updates the status of the ROE and authorizes any action/counter 
measure that needs to be taken. Each regional CW is supported by the rest of 
the aforementioned communities (ID, VA, IR), which represent subordinate 
communities in that each one of them holds ad hoc tasks. The C3IOS 
architecture can adapt to any organizational command structure, both 
syntactically and semantically, and this is why it was adopted by NASA, even 
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Figure 2.   Virtual Community Structure (From [8]). 
The ID community controls and monitors all of the available sensors and 
mobile agents in order to acquire timely host and network intrusion incident 
information [8]. The particular community is also responsible for conducting 
forensics on compromised or suspect center systems in the NASA example. 
Those types of data should be securely stored in an appropriate format and be 
accessible by the authorized cells. This category of sensors includes, among 
others, intrusion detection scanners, host-based IDS, firewalls, and mobile 
agents on duty to patrol the C2 system or dispatched with an assigned duty to 
achieve (e.g., to reconfigure sensors) [11]. As the information is acquired, it is 
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passed to the IR community. Again, in this section each cell can have varying 
responsibilities based on commander’s intent, doctrine, policy, ROE and other 
factors related to the mission. 
The IR community is responsible for proposing and executing—after the 
authorization of the CW commander—the actions needed to be employed 
against the attackers [8]. In order to respond in the most appropriate, lawful and 
efficient way, the commander need to obtain updates regarding the current status 
of the ROE in force and the availability of hardware/software offensive means. 
Besides the main task to execute a response, the IR community also provides 
recommendations with respect to the adopted COA and executes damage 
assessments to estimate the level of success of the engagement [11]. 
The Network Operations (NETOPS) community ensures operational 
readiness of the available computer and network assets to support the center 
mission and encounters vulnerabilities and network-design weaknesses 
discovered by the VA and ID communities [8]. The VA community works closely 
with NETOPS and engineering to mitigate vulnerabilities. NETOPS is also 
responsible for an imminent and efficient recovery, which includes actions such 
as restoring backed up data or reconstituting servers/networks. 
The Testbed (TB) community assists in communications and collaboration 
with the contractor engineers and other organizations working with the IAOC. All 
personnel, regardless of the different levels of expertise, require cyber operations 
training [8].  In the IAOC, there exist two different states of operation: the normal 
and the emergency state. In the first state, the communication and collaboration 
relates to operational testing of the IAOC and the new functionality of C3IOS or 
products integrated into C3IOS. In the emergency state, the communication and 
collaboration relates to emergency support to the IAOC, including using the 
testbed as an emergency backup to the IAOC, as a large-scale honeypot (e.g., 
as a honeynet), for rapid attack response code generation; and modeling and 
simulation (M&S) activities in support of an IR operation [8].  
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Finally, as Figure 2 illustrates, in addition to the core communities there 
exist dynamic ones that can be created for a specific task or operation and 
decommissioned after the task or operation is finished [8]. Any cell commander 
can authorize subordinate communities within its community or peer-level virtual 
communities at the tactical level. Anytime a cell commander authorizes the 
creation of a virtual cell, he/she is responsible to authorize membership, monitor 
the cell, and authorize decommissioning when necessary. 
Prior to 2004, the work on C3IOS included the completion of the IAOC 
CONOPS, the C3IOS Users Manual, the IA/CND CONOPS, the CyberC2 Users 
Manual, and the Prototype CyberC2 tool-set (Version 3 for Linux and Windows 
delivered April 5, 2004) [17]. During 2004, work continued with the establishment 
of a cyber C2 testbed operation at the Institute of Defense Analysis and Houston 
sites, along with work on a secure high-performance publish-and-subscribe 
messaging infrastructure.  The IAOC is now considered an out-of-date concept. 
The thrust of the work on C3IOS at present is to make it possible to deploy 
C3IOS across any enterprise, or even the national communications infrastructure 
and the global information grid, i.e.,  
globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities 
for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing 
information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support 
personnel. [18] 
C3IOS, can be used to conduct and mange full spectrum cyber warfare, 
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III. SCHMITT’S ANALYSIS 
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the whole world started to pay 
added attention to both kinetic- and cyber-based terrorist threats to national and 
international security.  
Cyber terrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It 
is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of 
attack against computers, networks, and the information stored 
therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its 
people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to 
qualify as cyber terrorism, an attack should result in violence 
against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to 
generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, 
explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe 
economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical 
infrastructures could be acts of cyber terrorism, depending on their 
impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly 
a costly nuisance would not. [6] 
Examples of the types of motivation for conducting an act of terrorism are 
financial, political, military, religious, and ideological. Attacks in cyberspace can 
have the same effect as kinetic attacks, such as a terrorist, member of an 
organized crime syndicate, or nation-state-sponsored information warrior sending 
malicious commands to a computer system that controls some energy source.  
An example of this would be the control system for automated passenger trains.  
The sending of malicious commands to its computer system could produce a 
mishap (e.g., two trains entering the same segment of track and colliding), 
resulting in death, injury, and property damage.  
Society is becoming ever more reliant on computer systems. Examples 
include electronic banking, electronic government, telemedicine, and smart 
power grids. All these systems are vulnerable to attack.   
Cyber conflicts can be analyzed in light of two areas of international law: 
jus ad bellum, also known as the law of conflict management, and jus in bello, 
the law of war. Jus ad bellum is the law governing the resort to the use of force—
 22
whether force is permissible or not, and jus in bello is the law that governs 
activities once jus ad bellum has determined that force may be used. The United 
Nations Charter clarifies it with the relevant articles mentioned below. 
Article 2(4):  
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations. [19] 
Article 39: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. [20] 
Article 51: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of 
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. [20] 
In a case of an attack, according to the above articles, the following four-
level hierarchy can be considered:  
1. Below Article 39, international peace and security. 
2. Between Article 39 and Article 2(4), comprised of threats to 
international peace and security. 
3. Between Article 2(4) and Article 51, made up of uses of force—
unlawful, but not permitting an armed response.  
4. Above Article 51, an armed attack—actions that permit (but do not 
require) an armed response because the inherent right of self-
defense has been activated.   
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Do the concepts of use of force or an armed attack apply to operations in 
cyberspace? The answer is not always clear, because cyber attacks can have 
minor consequences, but devastating ones as well. Professor Michael Schmitt 
created criteria for evaluating the consequences of cyber attacks.  Professor 
Thomas Wingfield extended Schmitt’s analytical technique by providing a means 
for quantifying the qualitative measures of consequences.  The seven 
characteristics are listed below:  
 “Severity: Armed attacks threaten physical injury or destruction of 
property to a much greater degree than other forms of coercion. 
Physical well-being usually occupies the apex of the human 
hierarchy of need.” [21] This characteristic refers to people killed or 
wounded and property damaged. 
 “Immediacy: The negative consequences of armed coercion, or 
threat thereof, usually occur with great immediacy, while those of 
other forms of coercion develop more slowly. Thus, the opportunity 
for the target state or the international community to seek peaceful 
accommodation is hampered in the former case.” [21] Immediacy is 
the time it takes for the consequences of an operation to take 
effect. 
 “Directness: The consequences of armed coercion are more 
directly tied to the actus reus than in other forms of coercion, which 
often depend on numerous contributory factors to operate. Thus, 
the prohibition on force precludes negative consequences with 
greater certainty.” [21 This characteristic refers to the relationship 
between an operation and its effects.  
 “Invasiveness: In armed coercion, the act causing the harm usually 
crosses into the target state, whereas in economic warfare the acts 
generally occur beyond the target’s borders. As a result, even 
though armed and economic acts may have roughly similar 
consequences, the former represents a greater intrusion on the 
rights of the target state and, therefore, is more likely to disrupt 
international stability.” [21] This characteristic Involves crossing 
borders. 
 “Measurability: While the consequences of armed coercion are 
usually easy to ascertain (e.g., a certain level of destruction), the 
actual negative consequences of other forms of coercion are harder 
to measure. This fact renders the appropriateness of community 




less suspect in the case of armed force.” [21] Measurability is the 
measure of the effect of the operation, either in number of victims 
or the value of the property damage. 
 “Presumptive Legitimacy: In most cases, whether under domestic 
or international law, the application of violence is deemed 
illegitimate absent some specific exception such as self-defense. 
The cognitive approach is prohibitory.” [21]  
 “Responsibility: refers to the degree to which the consequence of 
an action can be attributed to a state as opposed to other actors. 
The premise is that armed coercion is within the exclusive province 
of states and is more susceptible to being charged to states, 
whereas non-state actors are capable of engaging in such soft 
activity as propaganda and boycotts.” [6] This characteristic refers 
to the degree that the consequence of an action can be attributed 
to a party. 
By contrast, most other forms of coercion—again in the domestic and 
international sphere—are presumptively lawful, absent a prohibition to the 
contrary. The cognitive approach is permissive. Thus, the consequences of 
armed coercion are presumptively impermissible, whereas those of other 
coercive acts are not (as a very generalized rule). 
The law of war is defined by the United States Department of Defense as 
That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed 
hostilities. It is often called the law of armed conflict. The law of war 
encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities 
binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including 
treaties and international agreements to which the United States is 
a party, and applicable customary international law. [22] 
The above law is précis applying seven principles: 
 “Distinction of combatants and noncombatants, only members of a 
nation’s regular armed forces may use force, and they must 
distinguish themselves and not hide behind civilians or civilian 
property.  
 Military necessity, targets of attack should make a direct 
contribution to the war effort or produce a military advantage.  
 Proportionality, when attacking a lawful military target, collateral 
damage to noncombatants and civilian property should be 
proportionate to military advantage likely to be achieved.  
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 Indiscriminate weapons, weapons that cannot be directed with any 
precision, such as bacteriological weapons, should be avoided. 
 Superfluous injury, weapons that cause catastrophic and 
untreatable injuries should not be used.  
 Perfidy, protected symbols should not be used to immunize military 
targets from attack, nor should one feign surrender or issue false 
reports of cease fires.  
 Neutrality, nations are entitled to immunity from attack if they do not 
assist either side; otherwise, they become legitimate targets.” [6] 
Regarding combatants and noncombatants, military necessity and 
proportionality guarantees that wars should only be carried out by military forces, 
and the targets should be only military in character as well. The prohibitions 
against indiscriminate weapons and superfluous injury assure that no excessive 
means are used in conducting an attack, while perfidy and neutrality pledge 
immunity for either using protected symbols or not assisting the involved parts in 
the conflict.  
Moreover, cyber conflicts can be divided in three different categories:  
 “Cyber warfare at the state level when conducted in the interest of 
national security.” [6] 
 “Non-state actors whose cyber attacks are politically or socially 
motivated,” [6] and 
 “Cyber defense, particularly what is called hack back, strike back, 
or active response.” [6] 
The point is not to create responses for the above categories but instead 
present a framework that will determine if a specific cyber attack warrants the 
use of force and if it follows the law of information conflict. 
Estonia is considered one of the most developed countries in terms of its 
use of information technology, from being the first to use online voting to having 
almost all government agencies virtually connected. Estonia holds the lead in 
online banking, with about 95% of its banking operations being processed this 
way. Students in Estonia’s schools can get their exams results by Short Message 
Service (SMS) and parking fees can be paid via mobile phone interface [23]. 
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The attacks on Estonia in 2007 had an impact on the security of the nation 
[23]. The point is that not only the developing of the attack, but that all the 
dependency in computer-assisted systems creates higher vulnerabilities that can 
lead to catastrophic disasters. 
Moreover, the United Nations (UN) Charter takes a qualitative instead of a 
quantitative approach. The UN Charter framework was meant to diminish military 
actions, mainly military oppression between countries, even if that implied an 
increase in the use of economic or diplomatic coercion. The problem with this 
framework is that not all types of violence fit within the UN Charter parameters. 
Broad forms of violence (e.g., terrorism) are left out of the spectrum of what the 
UN Charter relates to, yet these forms of violence are also capable of at least the 
same mass destruction and deaths as the ones in the spectrum of the UN 
Charter. 
Laws (implemented either by force or by sanction), social norms, markets, 
and architectures regulate cyberspace. How one can address and measure 
cyber terrorism goes towards answering the question of “did the attack rise to the 
level of use of force?”  
Using common sense is not sufficient to answer this question. This is 
where Schmitt’s analysis has an important role to play by attributing a degree to 
each of the seven criteria and addressing the grey areas of the law by 
complementing them with a framework that will help to protect first of all lives, 
and then public and private property. This will allow cyber-intelligence measures 
to be within the legal bounds. In addition, this analysis will highlight the 
aforementioned grey areas, which will provide a way to address them in all the 
important aspects against cyber terrorism. 
Using Professor Schmitt’s words, “…as the nature of a hostile act 
becomes less determinative of its consequences, current notions of ‘lawful’ 
coercive behavior by states, and the appropriate responses thereto, are likely to 
evolve accordingly.” [21] 
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Consider attacks on transportation systems, such as passenger trains.  
Terrorists conducted kinetic attacks against train systems in Madrid in 2004 [24] 
and London in 2005 [25]. In 1995, members of the Aum Shinri-kyo cult carried 
out a sarin gas attack on the subway in Tokyo [26].  What if these attacks had 
been conducted using cyber means? 
Michael, Wingfield, and Wijesekera used Schmitt’s analysis on a 
hypothetical attack of a subway system [7]. They considered two scenarios: one 
involving a kinetic attack and the other a cyber attack.  For the kinetic attack 
involving the use of sarin gas during rush hour, the severity was rated as an 8 
(on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 as the highest level of severity), because of the 
number of people injured, the number of deaths, the amount of property damage, 
and the loss of intangible property. Immediacy was given an 8 because the 
attack took a matter of minutes, yet the effects could be long term (e.g., 
decontaminating, psychological effect on ridership). Directness was rated as 8 
because the effect could be determined form the cause, as the possible cause 
was the trains were attacked by terrorists. Invasiveness was given a 9, since the 
terrorists probably came from other countries. Measurability was an 8, as the 
number of lives taken could be counted and the monetary value of the lost 
property could be estimated. Presumptive legitimacy was an 8, because no 
nation or group has the right to carry out such an attack. Responsibility was a 5, 
because no one took responsibility for the attack. Therefore, the total of all the 
ratings was 54 with an average of 7.7 per rating.  
For the cyber attack scenario involving the hacking of the subway’s 
automatic train protection (ATP) system, the severity was 8 due to the collision of 
several trains resulting in multiple deaths, injuries and loss of property like in the 
kinetic attack. Immediacy was a 9, as even if the crashes occurred in a short 
amount of time with immediate effects, consequences (e.g., removing 
vulnerabilities in the software and restoring the confidence of passengers) took a 
lot of time to clear. Directness was 9, because one act had one effect. 
Invasiveness in this case was lower than for the kinetic attack because the attack 
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could be initiated from anywhere in the world. Measurability was a 9, because the 
effect of the attack could be measured but other effects could not be measured 
(e.g., loss of public confidence). Presumptive legitimacy was a 5 for the same 
reasons given for the kinetic attack scenario. Responsibility was a 5 because 
even if none of the modifications on the system software was understood when 
executed, according to the “repsia loquitur,” (the common law of negligence 
states that the elements of duty of care and breach can be sometimes inferred 
from the very nature of the accident even without direct evidence of how any 
defendant behaved [27]), the injuries of the passengers were a natural resort of a 
careless action. Therefore, the total of all the ratings was 50 with an average 
rating of 7.1.  The important thing to note from the two attack scenarios is that the 
cyber attack had a similar overall ranking to that of the kinetic attack. 
In this thesis, the authors investigate how Schmitt’s analysis can be 
integrated into C3IOS, but they recognize that other types of legal analysis would 
also need to be made available in C3IOS.  
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IV. THE PROPOSED VIRTUAL DYNAMIC LEGAL CELL 
One of the challenges in cyberspace is to define and detect a hostile act 
or the use of force. Another major challenge is to respond to cyber attacks in a 
timely and lawful manner.  In this chapter, the authors discuss the need for 
C3IOS functionality to be enlarged to support reasoning about the lawfulness of 
COA in response to cyber attacks. The authors refer to the part of C3IOS that will 
provide the user with this capability as the Virtual Legal Cell (VLC).  The aim is to 
provide users of C3IOS with the ability to obtain an early-as-possible qualitative 
and quantitative grounding for the appropriate response to a cyber incident, 
taking in to consideration the legal perspective of the action. There are two 
aspects of this cell: a dynamic aspect and a virtual one. By dynamic aspect, the 
authors mean that the cell can be allocated and deallocated as needed. The VLC 
is the specific virtual space in which experts in the law of information operations 
can interact with the other users of C3IOS.  
The legal cell will be responsible for conducting investigations and 
forensics analyses to enlighten areas of uncertainty or disagreement in multiple 
legal analyses, and will recommend actions by proposing the most accurate 
response plan (RP) concerning the adopted level of use of force in accordance 
with national/international law and the rules of engagement (ROE) in force. In 
order to be able to accomplish its duty, the center legal advisor (LA) community 
maintains a repository of all laws and policies and information about the attack. In 
order to address the growing threat of cyber intrusions, an academically 
comprehensive and operationally complete legal framework is needed based on 
multiple sources of information [4] (i.e., international, constitutional, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary). The VLC needs two interconnected decision trees: one 
for computers to execute autonomously at high-speed hardwires for independent 
implementation of clearly distinguishable, objectively verifiable criteria; and the 
second requiring human decision making and lower speed, requiring pre-
selected sources available to support lawyers in the “grey area” judgments [4]. 
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For this reason, actions are also synchronized with the center NETOPS 
community to ensure that the VLC always maintains capable hardware and 
software resources to carry out its operations, as a form of on-demand 
provisioning.  
The Kinetic Warfare Commander (KWC) and the subordinated Cyber 
Warfare Commander (CWC), or their equivalent in the non-combatant case, can 
authorize the instantiation of a new VLC. 
C3IOS does not impose an organizational structure.  In the example 
shown in Figure 3, there exist two VLCs that were created for two different 
decision-making situations. VLC D is in a joint community with the ID cells of two 
different regions, while VLC E was created by the KWC or the CWC to support 



































Figure 3.   Organizational Model. 
A simple vision for the roles of the members of the legal community can 
be as follows.  
Director of the Legal Cell (DLC):  
 Views any screen of the community 
 Assigns new tasks to the members of the community 
 Authorizes the final legal report and provides the final legal advice 
to the commander who initially authorizes the creation of the cell. 
Deputy/Assistant of the Legal Director (DLD DEP): 
Assists the DLC and assumes the duties of the director when he/she is 
absent.  
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Consultant Legal Team (CLT): 
 Group of lawyers and legal scholars (team of three) qualified and 
specializing in the law of armed conflict in cyberspace 
 View ID reports, resources, and statistics 
 Execute Schmitt’s analysis and forensic analysis 
 Generate legal reports and present the results of their assessments 
to the director of the cell. 
Legal Operator (LO): 
 Views any screen of the community 
 Receives all data and information from other communities (i.e., 
CWC, ID, VA) with respect to the current cyber incident 
 Exchanges messages with the community members and members 
of other cells where the communication is authorized (i.e., the ID 
community etc.) 
 Verifies information with NETOPS to accomplish hardware and 
software availability. 
From the time that the LA community is formulated, it continuously 
monitors reports from the Intrusion Detection (ID) cell and the other regional 
communities. The first aim is to collect all the available information regarding the 
cyber incident. Second, the legal community needs to check and analyze the 
sources of evidence for the unauthorized events. The legal experts review the 
incident by applying techniques such as Schmitt’s analysis. 
The purpose for conducting the analyses is to minimize the level of 
uncertainty associated with the incident, thus allowing for an informed decision 
about which technically feasible COA is best in terms of being congruent with 
law, policy, and ROE.  
As part of the development of the legal cell, the authors focused on the 
requirements for the C2 understanding, planning, and deciding activities of the 
VLC. 
Before determining how the VLC will be implemented, it is important to 
identify the qualitative nature and quantitative intensity of the threat.  There are 
two major types of cyber attackers:  state actors (those who act on behalf of a 
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government of a country) and non-state actors (e.g., recreational hackers, 
terrorists, organized criminals). State actors are easier to identify, and by 
attributing their actions to specific governments, one can address three 
thresholds in international law (Articles 39, 2(4), and 51 of the United Nations 
Charter) which divide the spectrum of violence into the following four zones:   
Below Article 39:  This condition is known as “international peace and 
security,” and while it does include various forms of political, economic, and 
diplomatic coercion, it is the preferred zone of international law because of the 
low levels of direct violence it employs. 
Between Articles 39 and 2(4):  Here are “threats to international peace 
and security,” as determined by vote of the UN Security Council. These are 
usually nonmilitary threats with the potential to cause widespread suffering or 
provoke military action if unaddressed.   
Between Articles 2(4) and 51:  A “use of force” is qualitatively military, but 
below the threshold that permits an armed response.  The intent of Article 2(4) is 
to identify unlawful military actions, while at the same time creating a requirement 
on the part of the defending nation to limit its response and avoid conflict 
escalation.  
Above Article 51:  An “armed attack” has taken place whose quantum of 
violence is sufficient to activate the inherent right of self-defense and permit an 
immediate, unilateral use of military force in response.     
The determination of which zone applies is the heart of jus ad bellum, 
which is the question of whether or not force may be applied. If that 
determination is affirmative, then jus in bello determines how that force may be 
applied, namely the limits of violence in a wartime setting.   
Although there is a clear academic distinction between state and non-state 
actors, real-world examples are more complicated.  There is a sliding scale of 
certainty (given the opaqueness and anonymous nature on the Internet), and a 
sliding scale of state sponsorship—from complete innocence through varying 
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degrees of passive or active support for cyber attackers to the final level, which is 
complete control and direction.  The tools of law enforcement (i.e., mutual legal 
assistance and extradition treaties) give way to intelligence operations (such as 
clandestine surveillance and covert operations) before military options are 
lawfully available.  The fact that non-state actors can cause as much damage as 
a state actors requires that mechanical applications of simple either/or rule sets 
be avoided. 
The expert members of the legal cell will base their analyses on legal 
authorities, policy norms, and technological lessons learned.  The Schmitt criteria 
are helpful in integrating these factors.  The legal cell will “assign” a group of 
lawyers to perform their own analysis and compare the results to achieve a better 
outcome.  This is one of the greatest advantages of the legal cell—different 
lawyers from various organizations in diverse locations working together within 
the C3IOS architecture in near real time.  One, of course, must be designated as 
the principal legal advisor with the ultimate responsibility for presenting the 
incident commander with legal advice in time to take effective action.   
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V. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VIRTUAL LEGAL CELL 
A. STARTING UP 
The first step in the authors’ requirements analysis was to identify users of 
C3IOS and other stakeholders whose decision-making or workflow would be 
affected by the introduction of the virtual legal cell. The authors applied a 
brainstorming technique to elicit statements from potential users and 
stakeholders about their perceived needs for legal and policy advice in the 
decision-making process in the context of conducting cyber warfare operations.  
From the statements of needs resulting from the brainstorming sessions, the 
authors identified a set of core or commonly defined needs. They then conducted 
a use case analysis o determine the context for specifying the requirements for 
decision-making. 
The following questions needed to be answered in order to identify 
stakeholders and the user requirements: 
 Who uses the system (e.g., legal advisors)? 
 Who is the customer (e.g., members of the armed forces)? 
 Who is affected by outputs of the system (e.g., the decision 
makers, first responders)? 
 Who evaluates/approves the deployment of the system for use? 
 Who maintain the system? 
 Who else, beyond the primary users can make use of the system 
(e.g., members of the private sector such as non-governmental 










Governmental/political actors; military actors; Judge Advocate 
General's (JAG) Corps Officers; private sector actors; 
government/military and legal regulatory teams; law 
enforcement officers; technologists; technicians; decision 
makers in government and in all different cells; first responders; 
and the rest of the systems operators.  
Users:  Cyber and Kinetic Warfare Commanders; legal advisors – JAG 
Officers; cyber warfighters 
Table 1.   Stakeholders and Users. 
In order to elicit valid requirements from stakeholders focused on different 
levels of expertise, the authors conducted one-on-one in-person meetings and 
teleconferences with the people who mentored their thesis.  Their mentors are 
subject matter experts—one of the architects of C3IOS, a professor who 
specializes in the law of information conflict, and a professor who specializes in 
the technical aspects of cyber warfare—and were able to play the roles of the 
spectrum of users and stakeholders. The following table contains a summary of 




The problem Commanders must be able to quickly assess the effects of a 
cyber attack to determine if their response is 
1) A potential use of force that is consistent with a pre-
defined set of cyber ROEs,  
2) Consistent with a measured response under the 
International Laws of War, and  
3) An appropriate measure of force necessary to counter the 
initial attacks and their effects?  
The commander must also determine if perpetrators are legal 
combatants or criminals, and whether a cyber incident has risen 
to a level requiring the use of force at all.  These decisions must 
be made at the same operational tempo as the cyber 
engagements.  
Effects Failure of commanders to address the problem within the 
framework described above can lead to undesirable legal and 
political effects with potential consequences in both the national 
and international arena.  Furthermore, cyber operations are 
conducted around the clock with unpredictable intensity and 
without regard to the well-defined levels of conflict. For example, 
the attacks on Estonia resulted in strategic levels of effects, while 
the traditional level of conflict was characterized as pre-
hostilities.  
And results in When this problem is not considered within the problem 
framework to include the operational tempo and consideration of 
effects that are less predictable and not consistent with the state 
of conflict, there is likely to be poor use of human resources; 
inappropriate responses (e.g., disproportionate use of force); and 
delayed reactions/responses; incorrect or poorly informed 
reasoning about the legality of responses to cyber attacks. 
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Benefits of a 
solution 
The proposed software supports:  
 legal reasoning in the area of responding to 
terrorist acts by  providing a computer-assisted means for 
experts to determine whether a terrorist cyber attack has risen to 
the level of a use of force, with the aim of helping the user 
reason about the grey areas of the law of information conflict;  
 information sharing in near real-time among the 
actors involved in defending cyberspace, with the aim of making 
recommendations and decisions with a minimum of uncertainty  
and incomplete information about the situation in the cyber 
battlespace; 
 better representation of results, and in this way, 
better clarification of thoughts for courses of actions and 
highlighting areas of misunderstanding or disagreement;  
 effective and legally justifiable responses against 
cyber attacks; 
 standardization of the decision-making process. 
The existence of this system will also allow the more efficient use 
of human resources. 
Table 2.   Elements and Descriptions. 
The two phases of brainstorming the authors used were idea-generation 
followed by idea-reduction. The goal was to identify all feasible ideas, focusing 
on the breadth instead of the depth of the ideas. The authors then used an 
informal, subjective ‘does-the-idea-have-merit’ test to prune the list of ideas down 
to a manageable size. Following the technique described in [28], the authors 
grouped similar ideas together and then ranked each group of ideas as being 
one of the following: critical, important, or useful. The authors used critical to 
connote indispensable to the implementation, important to connote a significant 
loss without a specific feature, and useful to connote nice-to-have. They 
observed that the most creative ideas resulted from discussions and 
combinations over unrelated issues with people with different levels of expertise, 
shown in the table below.  
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In order to establish the level of effort implied by each feature, the authors 
determined a rough order of magnitude:  low, medium, or high. The risk element 
is an assessment of the associated risk of each requirement. The 
prioritization/effort/risk estimations were based on the authors’ subjective 
judgment after interviewing the subject matter experts.  
 
Id Requirements Priority Effort Risk 
Timeliness of response 
001 Agile interactions among the users in the 
cells. 
Important Medium Low 
002 Real-time response among the different 
actors. 
Critical Medium Low 
Legal preparedness 
003 Provide a way to support standardization 
of types of actions by the creation of 
legal flow charts, to define the criteria 
and the menu of choices. 
Important Low Medium
004 Inclusion of templates and pre-planned 
doctrines, concerning different scenarios, 
to support the observe-orient-decide-act 
(ooda) loop. 
Useful Low Medium
005 Restricted format of actual language to 
allow communication of technicians with 
layers, with commanders, with politics 
and vice versa, with a small set of 
descriptive words, understandable by all. 
Important Medium High 
006 Capability of storing meaningful laws and 
books in place ahead of time 
(constitutional, legislative, executive, 
judiciary and international). 
Important Low Low 
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Dynamic cell and/or static legal cell 
007 Provide capability to distinguish real-time 
courses of actions. 
Critical Medium Low 
008 Support sharing of information quickly. Critical Medium Low 
009 Provide user interface to the appropriate 
law. 
Important Low Low 
010 Support integration among cyber and 
kinetic warfare commanders. 
Useful Medium Medium
011 Should be compatible from an 
interoperable standpoint with other 
countries’ leaderships systems. 
Important High High 
012 Ability of joining others cells of the 
system of systems. 
Critical Medium Medium
012a Each legal cell shall provide a toolbox 
with tools to support (analysis) legal 
work. 
Critical Low Low 
012b Cells shall operate in a secure 
environment. 
Critical Medium High 
012c Provide at least one static legal cell for 
each major kinetic mission. 
Critical Minimum Low 
Partitioning 
013 The system requires engineering 
partitioning in order to provide the 
capability to discriminate what can be 
done by humans (at lower speed) and 
what can be done by the system in an 
automated way (computer executed at 
high speed). 
Critical Medium Low 
Introduce the framework of Schmitt’s analysis 
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014 Provide a necessary framework to 
evaluate whether the attack grows to the 
level of ‘use of force’ beneath 
international law. 
Critical Medium Low 
Policies 
015 Necessity to constrain the satisfaction/ 
realization of pre-existing requirements. 
Important Medium Medium
016 Should provide a way to discriminate the 
categorization of legal paradigm (law 
enforcement, intelligence collection, 
military operations). 
Important Low Low 
Brokering 
017 Concerning info gathered, the system 
should have patching capability to hook 
up intelligence resources and break it 
down to different services. 
Critical High Medium
Chain of custody 
018 Should maintain the chain of custody 
(law to prosecute the attacker and 
handle evidence, etc). 
Important High Medium
019 Should log all the actions done in all the 
cells.  
Critical Medium Low 
020 System should maintain the ability of 




021 Should provide discrimination between 
fine-grained and coarse-grained type of 




022 Should provide a way to handle and 
adjust available sensors [4]. 
Important Medium Medium
HCI 
023  User-friendly context to present data to 
the lawyers (ensure bright line rules to 
reduce grey areas) [6]. 
Critical High Low 
024 User-friendly context to present legal 
advice to the others actors.  
Critical High Low 
Usability, extensibility, maintainability and capacity 
025 Should provide web-based and open-
source capabilities. 
Useful High High 
Situational awareness 
026 Should provide a way of distributing and 
publishing data among the users. 
Critical High High 
027 Assess the workload considering task 
analysis. 
Useful Medium Medium
027a Provide cyber sa to legal cells to ensure 
legal support is aware of changing 
situations.  Sa should be summarized 
(non-technical as possible) and provide 
enough detail for lawyers to assess the 
changing environment and legal 
implications.  
Useful Medium Medium
Table 3.   Requirements. 
Following the approach described in [29], the use case shown in Figure 4 
provides the context of the legal cell in terms of actors, their goals (represented 
as use cases), and the dependencies between those use cases. In the diagram, 
five critical use cases have been identified and subsequently elaborated with use 









B. EXPANDED USE CASE SCENARIOS 
1. UC-1: Manage Legal Resources 
Scope: C3IOS 
Level: User-goal level 
Primary Actors: Legal/national security advisors, legal regulatory team 
Secondary Actors: Kinetic Warfare Commander, Cyber Warfare 
Commander 
Stakeholders and Interests: 
The Kinetic Warfare Commander, Cyber Warfare Commander, and 
national security advisors want to have a robust, effective and predictive set of 
laws in force and embedded in the system’s databases to support their future 
activities/responses by providing the appropriate analysis and decision 
frameworks for actions. 
DIMPLE actors want to have all the necessary tools available to 
understand, explain and support in the most accurate, secure, timely and flexible 
way the potential consequences of cyber incidents.  
Pre-conditions:   
A set of laws will already be available in the C3IOS database.  
The legal regulatory teams continuously review and update the legal 
database to include all the respective laws and relevant case studies to support 
handling cyber incidents.  
The legal advisors of a core or a dynamic cell are logged in and maintain 
the capability through an easily accessible interface to access information, run 
analyses, and input their assessments. Legal advisors either in virtual core cells 




to support handling incidents and grounding their assessments of the situation. 
The legal regulatory team is also logged in to C3IOS either directly or indirectly 
via remote management software. 
The legal database is also available to all the other users of C3IOS, but in 
order to address administrative issues and protect the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of the data and information system, policy enforcement 
mechanisms are in place. 
Post-conditions:   
The legal regulatory team logs out with a fully operational legal database 
environment established and ready for connection and usage by legal advisors. 
Legal and national security advisors can effectively manage to use the 
system to extract all the updated information in the most direct and appropriate 
manner.  
Main Success Scenario: 
1. All the authorized users access the documented database. 
2. First responders request support regarding a cyber incident.  
3. A member of a CWC cell accesses the area of legal resources.  
4. If there are more requests for access, members of the cell repeat 
step 3. 
Alternate Scenario: 
3a. If the member of the cell is not authorized to enter legal resources, 
the access is denied. 
Frequency of Occurrence: 
For operation and training reasons, qualified members of the various cells 
maintain the right to access legal resources at anytime. 
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2. UC-2:  Perform Schmitt’s Analysis 
Scope: C3IOS 
Level: User-goal level 
Primary Actors: Legal regulatory team 
Secondary Actors: Legal advisors 
Stakeholders and Interests: 
The Kinetic Warfare Commander, Cyber Warfare Commander, and 
national security advisors want to have a robust, effective and predictive set of 
legal criteria to determine the level of force applied by an adversary via a cyber 
incident in order to respond in a lawful manner.  
Pre-conditions:   
The pre-condition of a certain request for legal advice of a cyber attack 
follows the implementation of Schmitt’s analysis, as a means to assess the attack 
in terms of the UN Charter. The United Nations Charter clarifies the jus ad bellum 
(the law of conflict management) and the jus in bello (the law of war), but it only 
applies to the countries that ratified this treaty, where the more relevant articles 
are Article 2(4), Article 39, and Article 51.  The goal is to implement a valid 
procedure to understand the nature of the incident (i.e., is this incident equivalent 
to an armed attack?) in order to determine the lawful set of responses. The 
answer is not always clear because a cyber attack can have unintended 
consequences, possibly even severe, in terms of the quantum of damage. In 
order to evaluate these consequences, Professor Michael Schmitt created a set 
of criteria, later refined by Professor Thomas Wingfield, to include not only 
qualitative but also quantitative measures based in seven different characteristics 
of an attack:  severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, 




The desired post-condition is the identification of the level of the attack 
with respect to international law, by the examination of the impact that the 
incident has in accordance with the evaluation of Schmitt’s seven criteria. One 
initially starts with an incident and then needs to determine if it is an armed attack 
or something below the threshold of an armed attack. One uses the outcome of 
the analysis to make and support a decision as to what, if any, level of force to 
apply in response to the incident. That is, the aim is to provide a systematic and 
well-grounded means for applying the most appropriate response from the set of 
available lawful responses permitted by policy. 
Main Success Scenario:  
1. When a computer network attack is detected, C3IOS will 
automatically provide legal advisors with a template for conducting 
Schmitt’s analysis. 
2. Measure the seven different criteria. 
3. Average the values supplied by each legal advisor for each 
criterion. 
4. Based on predefined threshold values for the average values, 
provide an assessment of whether it is an armed attack.  
5. Operator checks the evaluation obtained. 
6. Continue to measure the different criteria updates about the 
incident as they become available (via input to the databases). 
Alternate Scenario: 
4a. If the value is over the Article 51 threshold, will advise whether an 
operation constitutes an armed attack, and if so, would permit a use 
of force in response. 
4b. If value is under a determined threshold will not advise the use of 
force. 
5a. If the value changes and is over a determined threshold will advise 
the use of force. 
5b. If the value changes and is under a determined threshold will 




Frequency of Occurrence: 
The system will constantly monitor new or preexisting computer network 
attacks. Each time a virtual legal cell needs to be instantiated to support an 
exercise or operation, the system will provide the users with assistance in 
conducting Schmitt’s analysis. 
3. UC-3:  Share Information 
Scope: C3IOS 
Level: User-goal level 
Primary Actors: Legal regulatory Team 
Secondary Actors: Legal advisors 
Stakeholders and Interests: 
The Kinetic Warfare Commander, Cyber Warfare Commander, national 
security advisors, and DIMPLE actors want to have a robust, effective and 
predictive set of procedures in force and embedded in the system to support 
information sharing under need-to-know rules. All the information subscribed to 
by the actors should be published to them by C3IOS. 
Pre-conditions:   
Information that can be shared should be readily accessible to all users of 
C3IOS. The interaction among them should be accomplished as quickly as 
possible to operate in the direction of near real-time interactions that also 
maintain response timeliness. The system should enforce need-to-know rules.  
Post-conditions: 
The desired post-conditions describe near real-time exchanges and 
sharing of information to support cyber incident evaluation and response 




between organizations within the same country. A means for brokering 
information is needed to protect sources and methods while at the same time 
making information as available as permissible.  
Main Success Scenario: 
1. The system detects a computer network attack. 
2. The system starts to gather information about the attack. 
3. The system shares the information. 
Alternate Scenario: 
3a.  If information does not need to be shared deny access to 
unauthorized users.  
Frequency of Occurrence: 
This is a cyclical procedure to ensure the timeliness of a response. 
4. UC-4:  Manage Legal Advice 
Scope: C3IOS 
Level: User-goal level 
Primary Actors: Legal advisors, KWC, CWC  
Secondary Actors: Legal regulatory team 
Stakeholders and Interests: 
This use case describes the steps of the interactive process among the 
designated actors (KWC, CWC, commanders of the legal cell) under a 
framework of identified jurisdictions, in order to appropriately support feedback 
on latent or non-legal issues. The scope is to minimize the grey areas in law and 
policy to avoid unwitting cross-border consequences during a response to a 
cyber incident, under the status of national or international law margins. Besides 
the fact that different nations may adopt variant approximations concerning the 
way to express their cyber defenses, there are essential characteristics that 
naturally dictate response behaviors for those types of incidents [23]: 
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 It is difficult to predefine a specified legal regime for response, 
since there is no immediate certainty—or sometimes not even an 
adequate amount of information—about the origin, the level, or the 
consequences of the cyber incident. One needs the facts before he 
or she judges the legality of what has or will transpire. 
 Member nations of alliances or coalitions should have the ability to 
coordinate their actions while at the same time retain their own 
flexibility to respond using the means they deem necessary. 
 Global interconnected information and communication Technology 
(ICT) networks that increasingly support national and international 
security are structured under wide borders and multiple 
jurisdictions. 
Pre-conditions:   
The existence of a database of previous cases is essential to support the 
managing of the legal advice. By accessing this factual repository of different 
cases, in combination with the current status provided by the existing laws, the 
relevant background documentation, and the certainty that gives the level of their 
expertise, the legal advisors will manage to exchange and receive the necessary 
level of information to be able to inform the Commander’s decisions against 
cyber incidents. 
Post-conditions: 
To assist instant information sharing plus sound and valid evaluation of 
cyber incidents without violating the law and contravening policy, the legal cell 
can be created for the period that is essential to provide the inevitable support to 
Cyber Commanders or decision makers, and terminate when the incident and 
follow-on responses cease. Lawful default responses in accordance with 
defensive policies, because of the vast legal grey area, are predefined to 
delimitate bounds within which the responses can be ranged and activated in 
order to provide the defender more options. By the usage of all the available 
means, the legal advisors will finally manage the legal advice to support the 
commander’s decision-making.  
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Main Success Scenario: 
1. Authorized users access the documented database. 
2. The first responders submit a request for legal advice with respect 
to a cyber incident. 
3. The CWC authorizes the creation of a virtual legal cell and assigns 
the duty of the commander of the cell. 
4. The commander of the virtual cell authorizes membership. 
5. A legal advisor accesses the databases in which the data about the 
incident has been published and performs Schmitt’s analyses. 
6. The legal cell submits the legal advice and the results of the 
evaluation under the seven certain quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the incident in accordance with Schmitt’s analysis. 
7. The CWC responds. 
8. The CWC authorizes the decommissioning of the legal cell. 
Alternate Scenario: 
8a.   If the operation or the task is not completed a repetition of steps 1-7 
exists. 
Frequency of Occurrence: 
The system supports the formulation of legal advice on a continuous 
basis.  
5. UC-5:  Authorize the Creation of the Dynamic Legal Cell 
Scope: C3IOS 
Level: User-goal level 
Primary Actors: Kinetic Warfare Commander, Cyber Warfare Commander 
Secondary Actors: Legal/national security advisors 
Stakeholders and Interests: 
The Cyber or Kinetic Warfare Commanders maintain the right to authorize 
the creation of a dynamic legal cell to support their assessment when they are 
facing national incidents or coordinate legitimate international efforts against 
those types of events under common, consistent jurisdictions. 
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Each time a commander authorizes the creation of a cell, the cell 
commander is the one who authorizes membership. The commander who 
authorizes the cell is also responsible for monitoring—through assured 
delegation-of-authority procedures—the regular functioning and evolution of the 
cell and final decommission when the operation is finished. The new cell is at the 
level of command of the cell commander that permits its formation.  
Pre-conditions:   
The functionality of the system should support the need of initial actors 
who will retain the ability to authorize the creation of a dynamic legal cell. It is 
also necessary to have a pre-established doctrine to ensure timely secure 
communication capabilities to support the creation of new cells, in addition to a 
secure procedure for granting membership to a new cell. [10].  
Post-conditions: 
This virtual legal community, with dynamic interaction, will be able to 
support the decision-making process used for a specific task or operation and 
decommissioned after the task or operation is completed [8]. 
Main Success Scenario: 
1. A cell commander (e.g., the CWC of a specific region) requests the 
creation of a new legal cell for inter-regional collaboration on a 
problem that currently affects the commander’s region. 
2. The KWC authorizes the creation of the virtual legal cell and the 
cell commander for the new cell. 
3. A member of the KWC cell monitors the new cell.  
4. The commander who authorizes the creation of the legal cell 
determines the initial membership of the cell. 
5. Initial or extra members interact to provide the legal advice.   
6. The CWC authorizes the decommissioning of the virtual legal cell. 
Alternate Scenario: 
4a. If there is no available security clearance for a member to join the 
cell the access is denied. 
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Frequency of Occurrence: 
Variable, according to the frequency of occurrence of cyber incidents. 
C. DISCUSSION OF REQUIREMENTS 
In order to revolve the development of the legal cell the authors attempt to 
clarify and expand the requirements for this cell, focusing heavily on the 
requirements for the C2 understanding, planning, and deciding activities involved 
in applying Schmitt’s analysis.  
1. Legal Foundation for Cyber Warfare 
Given the short timeline over which cyber incidents occur, a legal 
foundation for cyber warfare and the ability to quickly provide legal guidance to 
commanders while engaged in cyber conflict is a must.  Given the evolving 
international laws pertaining to cyber warfare, commanders need to be cognizant 
of legal guidelines that could potentially govern the execution of cyber operations 
and their effects on noncombatants. Since there is little legal reference or 
precedence for cyber warfare, commanders conducting cyber operations will 
need routine and continuous legal advice.   
Vigorous legal preparedness procedures can release critical thinking and 
essential creative forces that will explore military, law enforcement, and 
intelligence issues in order to handle warfighting, legal prosecution, and 
intelligence gathering activities.  
The proposed legal component for C3IOS should allow for the integrated 
gathering of templates and usage of predefined doctrine, policy, law, and 
procedures for possible attack scenarios that could unfold. The adoption of 
relevant procedures ahead of time, combined with an extensive use of pre-
accepted criteria as well as a potential menu of choices, will prove highly 
beneficial for the modeling procedures. Relevant legal flow charts, based on 
different sets of questions, will also work in this direction, in order to set 
predefined criteria and a specific menu of choices. In this way, lawful, automated 
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default responses in accordance with defensive policies in force can be 
achieved. Due to “the vast legal gray area which exists today operates in favor of 
the attacker,” a predefined delimitation of those bounds within which the 
responses can be ranged and activated “would provide the defender with more, 
rather than fewer, options.” [4]  
A requirement is that the applied format should be an intuitively 
understandable one that effectively bridges the differences with respect to the 
levels of expertise. There is also a requirement that upon detection of an attack 
all of the available information (e.g., effects, side effects, origin, and evolution) be 
disseminated in a usable format to personnel with no special technical skills. 
They will analyze/evaluate the reality of the situation and propose/discuss the 
action that needs to be taken.  
The case of Estonia constitutes a persuasive example, since it is highly 
reliant in all aspects of society on information technology. Estonia was the first 
country to use online voting, have almost all government agencies virtually 
connected, and rely almost exclusively on electronic payment and banking. At 
the same time, such an infrastructure provides a tempting target for malefactors 
who are intent on disrupting society. During the Bronze Soldier attacks of 2007, 
even when the consequences were more than obvious, the Estonian government 
was not adequately prepared to gather, process, disseminate, and act upon data 
about the attacks, which also left their legal experts in a position of providing 
advice based on uncertain and incomplete information. To the authors’ 
knowledge, there was no system like C3IOS in place to support the defenders.  
In this direction, the authors conclude that the derived requirement demands the 
usage of a restricted subset of natural language, which will allow the automated 
management and flow of information among the users, based on a limited set of 
descriptive words understandable by all users of C3IOS. 
Efficient cyber security and defense requires an understanding 
about the cross-border of cyber threats, and the necessity to clearly 
defining, legally establishing, and regularly exercising policies and 
practices for cyber incident management. Those policies need to 
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include joint public and private sector responsibilities as well as the 
necessary international collaboration. The legalities and political 
ramifications of cyber security defense and response options need 
to be predefined at all relevant levels within military and civilian 
security departments, law enforcement and intelligence offices, 
information and communications technology companies, foreign 
affairs agencies, and international alliances and organizations. [30]  
2. Dynamic and Static Cells 
To reach consensus on what actions to take in response to an attack, 
there is a requirement to retain the legal expertise in the field. The great 
uncertainty on the cyber battlefield in addition to the commander’s need to be 
always legally advised mandates the existence of these legal cells, which brings 
close to the field a wide range of legal expertise in fending off relevant incidents 
and supports the appropriate procedures that should be followed, taking into 
consideration the complex legal perspective. Up until now, it is that the 
assistance is offered by the physical existence of the respective personnel to the 
core/static cells of cyber and kinetic commanders.  
There is a requirement that static cells should be assigned at least per 
major kinetic mission, manned with a round-the-clock watch jointly by experts 
from key sectors to assure adequate legal assurance. The dynamic cell should 
be created in the base of eventuality of occurrence to assist cross-domain 
incidents and terminated afterwards. 
What is proposed for this new legal component of the system is, in 
addition to the static cells, the introduction of a new dynamic cell that is able to 
support all the previous tasks and address the demanding cross-domain 
information sharing and collaborative requirements. “A full understanding and 
effective response may only be possible by bringing information from those 
various sources together for the benefit of all.” [31] The analysis and response, 
especially to the cross-border cyber incidents, requires high-level coordination 
and modulation of actions among different governmental and other organizations 
of the nations based on interpretation of cyber actions in accordance with the 
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respective set of laws in force. An obvious problem is that those interpretations, 
or even the terminology that is in force, might differ significantly from one nation 
to another.  
Article 25 of the European Union (EU) Data Protection Directive 
permits the transfer of Personable Identifiable Information (PII) to a 
non-EU country only if the European Commission has determined 
that the non-EU country ensures an adequate level of protection. 
As a whole, U.S. privacy and information protection law does not 
meet the Commission’s standards. However, EU PII can still be 
shared with the United States under certain contractual 
arrangements by which the receiving U.S. entities agree to data 
processing and sharing constraints that meet the Data Protection 
Directive’s requirements. For example, air carriers operating flights 
to or from the United States or across U.S. territory have 
contractual agreements that permit the carriers to share EU 
passenger name records (PNR) data with U.S. customs authorities. 
In addition, U.S. entities that voluntarily certify to the U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor Framework may receive EU PII. Many non-EU countries—
such as Australia, Argentina, Canada, and Switzerland—have 
adopted privacy laws similar to the EU’s law. [32]  
To assist timely information sharing as well as sound and valid evaluation 
of cyber incidents without violating these legal requirements, the proposed legal 
cell must be persistent; that is, available for the duration in which the decision 
makers need to use the cell.  There is also a requirement to terminate legal cells 
when they are no longer needed, such as the conclusion of a conflict or when the 
creation of a new cell makes an existing cell redundant.  Upon termination of a 
cell, there is also a requirement that the information processed by that cell be 
archived for future use in operations, training, studies, and investigations.  
Another requirement for the system is to provide the capability to 
distinguish and support real-time course-of-action formulation and execution. 
Thinking in terms of the ‘Cube’ [33] described by Thomas C. Wingfield and 
Eneken Tikk—technological (the “possible”), legal (“permissible”), and policy (the 
“preferable”) dimensions in cyber warfare operations—“allows us to organize the 
process of cyber security implementation as opposed to the substance of cyber 
security” [33] Wingfield and Tikk’s ‘Pyramid’ [33] provides a way to categorize 
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three different types of responses against a cyber attack, based on the 
preferable/allowed time of the response. The approach involves distinguishing 
between actions that should be adopted immediately—almost supported by 
automated procedures—and reactions that might be taken after some 
consideration. Presumptions are “binary” yes-or-no rules based on predefined 
criteria and planned countermeasures that aim to support the first responder’s 
automated reaction.  Algorithms can also be executed by an automated system, 
but it instantiates a parallel decision-making path to indicate the type or the level 
of extra defensive actions that need to be taken. The law defines time-consuming 
actions that must be supported by an extensive decision-making procedure. This 
type of response refers to cases in which the decision maker cares more about 
the quality of the advice than the timeliness of the response. Finally, the ‘Screen’ 
[33] identifies an easily accessible user-friendly HCI, which integrates a huge 
repository of data easily accessible by the respective humans involved in cyber 
incident management. The three proposed constructs by Wingfield and Tikk 
should be incorporated into C3IOS since they “represent the status quo of cyber 
security law and policy, and highlight issues relevant for regulatory and policy 
authorities at the international, national, and private enterprise levels.” [33].  
Another critical constraint should be the ability to maintain integration 
among other vital cells of respective commanders and decision makers to 
support integrated cyber/kinetic operations, testing and training. Even though the 
notion of a dynamic cell is a feature already embedded in the architecture of 
C3IOS, one needs to identify it as an essential characteristic to achieve efficient 
interaction among the wide range of types of expertise needed to fend off cyber 
attacks.  These include at a minimum the categories of stakeholders called out in 
the DIMPLE model [30]: diplomatic corps, intelligence community, military, 
politicians, legal community, and economy community. This requirement is 




3. Human Computer Interaction 
Requirements placed on the Human Computer Interface (HCI) for C3IOS 
are of paramount concern, as the main aim of the system is to support 
collaboration and communication among humans. C3IOS already has a toolbox-
like capability for customizing the presentation of data to the needs of the 
different types of stakeholders. 
“Although perfect real-time knowledge of all cyber threats is an impossible 
goal, it is realistic to do much better at providing a richer, better integrated picture 
of our cyber security to the technologists, attorneys, and political leaders who will 
have to collaborate to avert the next cyber attack.” [33] The notion of the ‘Screen’ 
presented by Thomas C. Wingfield and Eneken Tikk can be very helpful to define 
the HCI. There is a requirement that the cell provide users with the ability to 
access “educational materials, lessons learned, and white papers, as well as 
relevant legal and policy instruments, providing experts and decision-makers with 
up-to-date and quality instructions on different aspects of cyber security.” [33]  
The HCI also needs to provide a clear picture of the context of discourse 
in a collaboration to support identifying the relevant bright line rules and reducing 
grey areas of the law even with imperfect knowledge of the current situation. On 
one hand, one wants to have an efficient comparative framework that will allow 
first responders to communicate in a timely and understandable manner the 
information about a cyber incident while at the same time making it possible for 
the legal experts to do likewise for the benefit of the first responders and the 
other stakeholders [8].   
Tikk et al. provide use with some examples of the confusion that might 
occur among different actors when interpreting the term “cyber attack.” The 
actual incident may only involve distributed denial-of-service attacks 




scale, well-organized campaign with far reaching consequences.  The choice of 
words is important when dealing with stakeholders because they each come with 
preconceived notions of what the terms mean. Tikk goes on to write  
The term ‘cyber security’ is currently used in the United States (US) 
legislation (e.g. Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002), 
whereas the European Union (EU) refers to terms such as network 
and information security (NIS), information and communication 
technology (ICT) security, information technology (IT) security, 
information security, network security, etc. [34] 
Conversely, “a uniform understanding of the details of cyber incidents 
would promote expert discussions in the field and avoid parallel vocabulary on 
the topic of common concern.” [34]  
Another facet of the HCI is usability, which is concerned with how easy 
interfaces are to use and the methods to improve the use of the system.  
Usability is defined by the following: learnability (i.e., accomplish basic tasks in a 
first approach), efficiency (i.e., perform tasks after understanding the design), 
memorability (i.e., after being away from the system, how easy is to start using 
correctly), errors (i.e., how bad errors are and how difficult is to recover from 
them), and satisfaction (i.e., how pleased the users are). There will be derived 
requirements for usability such as providing online help to assist users in 
understanding what functionality is available to them in the legal cell and how to 
use that functionality. 
4. Timeliness of Response 
“Timeliness” is highly related to “window of opportunity,” which is the 
measure of how time is managed; in other words, time between the occurrence 
of an event and when actions are taken. A “system response time” is the total 
elapsed time between the received stimulus and the delivered response. This 
stimulus usually contains a lot of uncertainty, and any decision should be delayed 
until this uncertainty is lowered to an acceptable threshold (the more time spent 
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to reduce uncertainty, the longer the response time), as a certain option make 
take more time but can have a more desirable result with something called 
“quality of option.”  
The right response at the right time is about tempo (“The tempo tells us 
how complex an environment the system can handle, while the response time 
tells us when it responds in time,” [35] and is critical when some type of incident 
or mishap is about to occur.  After an attack, there are actions that need to be 
taken, and the time to take them is vital in the development of a response. 
Nevertheless, pre-actions should exist in order to help to accelerate these 
responses. There is never an answer to everything; time is needed to react and 
to make decisions in different situations.   
Two important requirements should be introduced related to agile 
interactions among the users in the cells and a timely response among the 
different actors. The mode to establish the interactions among the users is a 
meaningful step for the C3IOS system; users of C3IOS can instantiate and join 
cells at any time to collaborate. When an attack happens, automated actions with 
no immediate human oversight (reflecting unambiguous determinations of lawful 
conduct for defense against any potential intruder) are taken. The automated 
proxies for the human first responders can respond based on measures in black 
or white if-then rules and algorithms built into the system (i.e., decisions based 
on objective criteria). The human first responders must monitor the situation and 
take action when the automated system cannot respond on its own or the system 
takes or may take an incorrect, ill-advised, or unlawful action. Thus, the actions 
of the humans will contribute to the lumped lag (i.e., the sum of the delays) in 
responding to any stimulus.  Thus, there is a requirement for the C3IOS 
operational and system architectures to support rapid legal analysis and 
response within the cyber C2 OODA loop. 
There are human factors that need to be taken into account in partitioning 
the system into its automated and manual pieces [36].  For example, 
compatibility, which refers to relations among control and displays, affects how 
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an input will be received, processed, and finally selected in the course of action.   
One must also consider that the human operator’s can speed the learning, and 
the reaction processes, with fewer errors. As another example, consider 
processing time, which is the time a person takes to process information.  These 
times range from one person to another and vary according to the complexity of 
the processing task. As a third example, human operators can become 
overloaded with information and as a result fail to complete their tasks on time or 
correctly.  There will be derived requirements tied to the performed tasks to 
better understand the needs of the human users of the virtual legal cell. 
5. Schmitt Analysis Framework 
There will be derived requirements for supporting the information 
collection, processing, and dissemination related to each of the seven criteria 
used in the Schmitt analysis, as well as the collaboration between the lawyers to 
develop qualitative rankings for each criterion, translate the qualitative rankings 
into qualitative values, and reach a consensus on whether this is an armed 
attack. 
6. Policies 
As mentioned by Lessig [37], there are four aspects in the regulation of 
cyberspace: 
 The laws, created by governments with the objective of sanctioning 
and forcing; 
 Social norms, based on expectations of encouragement or 
embarrassment; 
 Markets, regulated by price and availability; 
 And architecture, what is feasible in relation to technology. 
A policy can be raised from governance, which grounds collective choice 
and efficiency. According to [38],  
A single policy must be set that cannot help but affect all those 
within the scope of the community. Varied preference values must 
be aggregated such that the single value is acceptable and 
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considered legitimate by the community…Even when individuals 
can act upon their individual preferences (values), an aggregate 
value set by a central institution may be more efficient or rational 
over a longer time frame for the individuals of the community. In 
such cases, it is useful for a central authority to establish a single 
value rather than (1) requiring each individual to undertake the 
transaction cost of negotiation, or (2) permitting market failures and 
short term irrationality. 
Policy is a plan of actions to steer choices and attain a coherent result, or 
what is done continuously even without any plan. It is also choice between 
decisions, discriminating the costs and priorities, in consideration of the impact 
they will have on the behavior of the system.  Policy specifies the latitude 
decision makers have in applying the law.  Thus, there is a requirement that the 
legal cell inform the users of the policy that is applicable to the law.  
7. Brokering 
Understanding that cyber conflicts can be borderless, regional, national 
and international, security must be addressed. As stated in the Cyber Security 
Collaboration Report of May 21, 2009, “operational collaboration enabled by 
strong, effective information sharing, which is vital in a cyber threat environment 
that is relentless and increasing in scope,” [32] the triumph on these types of 
situations depends on the degree of using and information sharing.  
At the 2009 Cyber Conflict Legal and Policy Conference, there was 
discussion that the legal and policy framework should be characterized by a 
comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach that incorporates legal measures 
for the prevention and response to cyber threats as a cross product of 
international collaboration and cooperation [30]. This should be accomplished 
without neglecting national limitations of private sector legal rights and 
responsibilities for the ICT systems [30]. To realize such a goal the cells and 
C3IOS as a whole must be trusted to enforce confidentiality, integrity, availability 
and other security policies.  The challenge is to provide an adequate level of trust 
in a cross-domain information-sharing environment. 
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Information brokering is about getting the right information to the right 
people at the right time,  Not everyone involved in responding to a cyber incident 
needs to know everything about the incident.  The system needs a capability to 
control access and operations on data, in a role-by-role basis.  Given the sheer 
number of people involved in responding to a cyber incident, it would not be 
practical to administer access rights on an individual-by-individual basis. 
Technologically speaking, what is needed is for C3IOS to be a high-
assurance system that provides for cross-domain multilevel security (CDMLS) 
[39].  C3IOS has some of the attributes of cloud computing, including dynamic 
provisioning, which raises many issues of trust [40].  Thus, there will be derived 
security requirements for C3IOS. 
There are laws in place like the 2003 Legislative and Regulatory Task 
Force Report [41] or the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 [42] between different 
countries, the 2007 NSTAC Report to the President on International 
Communications [43], and Article 25 of the European Union (EU) Data Protection 
Directive. There are also liability protection models like The Support Anti-
terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act) [44] and 
The Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness and Responsibility Act of 1998 [45]. C3IOS 
already has mobile agent patrols (i.e., dynamic sensors) that can be used to 
construct lawful plans in order to help control and search for information relevant 
to an incident. 
As mentioned in the references above, cross-domain involves 
dissemination of info across multiple security levels, organizational boundaries, 
and information systems (e.g., “Intelligence Community (IC) currently classifies 
information to protect the sources and methods of its intelligence collection 
activities. The IC is therefore reluctant to share detailed cyber security threat 
data, fearing that the private sector may not adequately protect the sources of 




community. To repeat, trust relations and safe ways of communication have to be 
addressed, not to jeopardize the sources and the methods of collection, 
processing, and dissemination of information. 
8. Granularity of Information 
There is a requirement to be able to control the networks of different types 
of sensors available in C3IOS to ensure that the users of C3IOS can obtain 
information at the appropriate level of granularity for the decision-making task at 
hand in the legal cell. For example, to obtain a fine level of granularity, a user 
may need to focus all of the available sensors on a particular object or area of 
interest in cyberspace.  C3IOS provides for: 
 Static sensors (intrusion detection systems (IDS), firewalls, tripwire, 
etc.) 
 Mobile agents (sensors) tuned to look for a specific direction or task 
to accomplish. They are lightweight agents that are dispatched to 
other machines/areas in order to drill down and collect information. 
This information is published (it does not matter where it comes 
from, but if it is needed to the rest of the cells) respectively to other 
cells and to their one cell (commander). 
Another requirement is to have the system assist the user in setting the 
granularity through automatically making adjustments or making 
recommendations to the user. In order to meet timeliness requirements, one 
must match the level of granularity of information to the time allotted for making a 
decision.  For example, for situations in which the response must be made 
quickly, the sensing can be set for coarse granularity:  there is no time for the 
human or system to wait for or process fine levels of information. In addition, the 
system will need to take into account the tradeoff between speed and the risk of 
making the wrong decision based on using a suboptimal level of granularity.  For 
example, if the legal experts must make a decision whether to launch a counter 
attack, they may need to take additional time and obtain a fine level of 
information.  By doing so, it minimizes the risk that the commander will make a 
decision that results in actions that fall in the category of cyber war crimes (e.g., 
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application of a disproportionate level of force).  In other words, the requirement 
here is to “gain a competitive advantage over its opponent by reducing in some 
way the timeliness, accuracy, or precision of data and information utilized by the 
software agents on the targeted cooperative engagement grid.” [46]  
9. Scalability, Availability, Maintainability, and Survivability 
The legal cell will need to be able to scale in size as users join and leave 
the cell. C3IOS will need to be able to handle the growth in the number and size 
of legal cells in addition to the needs for communication, processing, and storage 
capacity.    
Maintainability is concerned with the ease and speed with which a system 
can be restored to operational status after a failure occurs. Availabilty is 
concerned with system-up time.  Survivability is concerned with being able to 
continue to operate under adverse conditions.  The legal cells must be highly 
available, maintainable, and survivable.  Given the high tempo of cyber battle, 
even a short period of unavailability of the system would be unacceptable.  The 
attackers may even try to attack C3IOS itself.  Thus, C3IOS must have its own 











Integrated C2 systems for use in cyberspace are needed because 
conventional C2 systems are tailored to the requirements for kinetic warfare and 
not cyber warfare. Cyber attacks can target multiple organizations concurrently, 
so there is a need to provide information sharing, coordination of COA, 
situational awareness, and other C2/BM capabilities both within and across 
administrative domains. C3IOS is such a prototype C2/BM system; however, at 
present it does not include a means for facilitating the participation and 
assessment by legal experts in regards to the lawfulness and policy implications 
of a proposed COA.  Decisions made solely on local information in large-scale 
distributed systems are not optimal and may result in unintended or unwanted 
results, such as the commander taking unlawful action that makes him or her a 
war criminal or a civilian a criminal. Thus, there is a need for computer-assisted 
legal reasoning for distributed C2/BM in cyber operations to enhance the ability 
of defenders to obtain legal advice about a COA in a short enough time window 
to keep OODA loops less than or equal to that of the attackers.  
In this thesis, the authors proposed the addition of a virtual dynamic legal 
cell to C3IOS. One of the challenges in cyberspace is to identify or define a 
hostile act and the subsequent use of force against it. The legal cell will support 
the cyber warfare activities by providing a qualitative and quantitative grounding, 
taking into consideration the legal perspective. This cell will act as a means for 
defenders to engage experts in the law of information conflict to assess proposed 
COAs. Among other things, the legal advice community will maintain a library of 
laws and policies, guidance given in past operations, and other information that 
will be useful to the commander and his or her team of defenders. This cell will 




criteria, without losing human reflection and creativity by using synchronized 
actions to ensure the maintenance of capable software and hardware resources 
to carry out the operations.  
Initially, the legal advice team is created with legal experts that will review 
the data provided to them by C3IOS about the cyber incident. In the authors’ 
case study, they envision that the legal experts will check and analyze the 
sources of evidence for the event by engaging Schmitt’s analysis and finally 
determine if there is any reason for the use of force under international law. The 
final product is the creation of a legal basis for a particular type of response to 
the attack, presented in a format tailored to the needs of the decision maker and 
authorized members of the cell in order to support their ability to react rapidly to 
an attack as the attack progresses. 
The authors developed a set of requirements for the Virtual Legal Cell via 
the use of brainstorming among the authors, an academic cyber researcher, a 
C2 structure expert, and an attorney who specializes in the law of information 
conflict. The authors also conducted role playing (e.g., warfighter, policy maker). 
The first step in the requirements engineering exercise was to identify the 
stakeholders and users of the system. Within the boundaries of the three critical 
dimensions in cyber warfare operations—the possible, the preferable and the 
permissible—the goal was to identify the initial set of requirements. The authors 
relied on simple direct interviewing using context-free questions to elicit the 
requirements and generate ideas, followed by the application of idea-reduction 
techniques. The requirements were grouped by the usage of similarity criteria 
and prioritized with the following rankings: critical, important and useful. Critical 
means indispensible, important refers to loss significance, and useful is nice-to-
have implementation wise. Moreover, the level of effort was established and risk 
associated with each one of the requirements based on the authors’ subjective 
judgment was assessed. Lastly, the authors expanded each of the requirements 
in order to clarify the understanding, planning, and deciding activities as they 
pertained to the legal cell. 
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B. FUTURE WORK 
This core set of capabilities is just a first approximation that will change 
over time when the virtual legal cell will be made available to the community. The 
users will likely identify additional requirements for the legal cell and C3IOS, so a 
plan needs to be developed for the evolution of C3IOS. In addition, validation of 
the requirements still needs to be done. 
The virtual cell will have to continuously enhance the communication and 
decision-making processes. More research needs to be done on the underlining 
distributed system messaging of publish/subscriber versus request-reply, which 
is more relatively delayed on large global networks than on the actual 
communication themselves. Publish-and-subscribe communications are used to 
create real-time custom signatures for specialized tasks. They are implemented 
by broadcast usage rather than multicast techniques, since the subscriber does 
not need to know where the publisher is located, and conversely the publisher 
does not need to know where the subscriber is either. The advantage of C3IOS 
in terms of speed and performance comes from its peer processing architecture 
that does not need to go across the network to get data, but as soon as user 
subscribes the data it becomes available to the whole community of users, which 
minimizes the processing, messaging and data acquisition. The applied models 
or approaches are the notions of dynamic system reconfiguration, honeynets, 
mobile agent patrols, secure publish/subscribe communication protocols, 
movement of state, and virtualization for deception purposes. The current status 
of C3IOS is a distributed cyber C2 system that can be tailored and deployed 
across any enterprise, or even the national communications infrastructure and 
the global information grid. Send and receive messages with the community 
members and authorized members of other cells, is a major research issue. A 




The cell has to implement provide for decision trees to increase the speed 
of the decision making process, based on objective verifiable criteria, without 
losing human reflection and creativity [4]. This standardization of the decision-
making process can be done with algorithms that can be executed by an 
automated system and also support those tasks that are human-centered, in 
particular those that are carried out to address gray areas of the law and the 
consideration of policy.  
C3IOS technology has to accommodate and easily integrate either civilian 
or military organizations, so they can both use this technology and the 
operational model at the same time in an effective manner. The proposed legal 
cell can be used by either the military or private sector, because it will provide 
legal reasoning regarding what the organization can do to protect itself. This is a 
key point, since cyber warfare is not a military activity alone, as the military also 
uses civilian critical infrastructure. C3IOS architecture offers the ability to deploy 
cells on both the military and the civilian side, so the study of the better 
architecture that will facilitate this integration is also a great research area.  
On the other hand, there needs to be information sharing, as defined in 
the requirements. Proper information sharing, which is the right amount to deal 
with the threat and create mitigation measures but at the same time protect the 
methods and sources, is a very sensitive field. Information sharing plus sound 
and valid evaluation of cyber incidents without violating security policy is 
essential to provide the inevitable support to Cyber Commanders’ or decision 
makers. Lawful default responses in accordance with defensive policies, because 
of the vast legal gray area, should be predefined to delimitate bounds within 
which the responses can be ranged and activated in order to provide to the 




Of course, a next step is to build a prototype of the legal cell and have 
users of C3IOS try out and provide feedback about the cell.   Here is will be  
important to capture the complexity and nuances of diverse national approaches 
to warfighting and more specifically requirements for computer-assisted legal 
support for decision making.  
Additional research is needed on protecting C3IOS from being 
manipulated by an attacker in a spy-versus-spy manner.  For instance, how could 
C3IOS be strengthened so that misinformation provided to the system can be 
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